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If there is one agreement between theorists of modernity and those of post-modernity, it is about the 
centrality of consumption to modern capitalism and contemporary culture. To thinkers as different as 
Werner Sombart, Emile Durkheim and Thorstein Veblen at the turn of the twentieth century, 
consumption was a decisive force behind modern capitalism, its dynamism and social structure. More 
recently, Anthony Giddens has presented consumerism as simultaneous cause and therapeutic response 
to the crisis of identities emanating from the pluralization of communities, values and knowledge in 
‘post-traditional society’. Post-modernists like Baudrillard have approached consumption as the 
semiotic code constituting post-modernity itself: ultimately, signs are consumed, not objects. Such has 
been the recent revival of theoretical interest in consumption that the historian might feel acutely 
embarrassed by the abundance of choice and the semiotic and, indeed, political implications of any 
particular approach. Which theory is most appropriate for the historical study of ‘consumer society’? 
What is being consumed, by whom, why, and with what consequence differs fundamentally in these 
writings: should we study objects, signs or experiences, focus on the drive  to emulate others or to 
differentiate oneself, analyse acquisitive mentalities or ironic performances, condemn resulting 
conformity or celebrate subversion?  
 
It is helpful to note that the theoretical debate about consumption in the last two decades has in the 
main been driven by a philosophical engagement with ‘modernity’ (or its disappearance), not by an 
empirical reassessment of the historical dynamics of consumption; in stark contrast with, say, 
Sombart’s earlier empirical work on luxury, or the Frankfurt School’s research into mass society. The 
changing pictures of consumption thus followed on a changing assessment of ‘modernity’, not vice 
versa, and this theoretical dynamic inevitably had a decisive effect on how consumption and the 
consumer are portrayed in these texts. We encounter the ‘modern consumer’, the ‘traditional consumer’ 
and the ‘post-modern consumer’ as ideal-typical constructs. These may be well suited to provide 
commentary on the condition of ‘modernity’ or ‘post-modernity’. They are less helpful for a historical 
understanding of consumption, since they present holistic, static and finished end-products rather than 
problematize how (and whether) these different types have emerged, developed, and stood in relation 
to each other in different societies at different times. 
 
What, then, should be the unit of enquiry for historical research? Should we write a history of 
‘consumerism’ or ‘consumer society’, of ‘consumption regimes’ or ‘consumer culture’? Historians 
have largely sidestepped this interpretive problem. The prolonged debate about the merit of ‘class’ and 
‘society’ shows that this is not because the profession is theory-challenged. Far from it, it might be 
argued that ‘consumer society’ or ‘consumerism’ have been adopted just as ‘class society’ became 
problematic. One reason for this conceptual silence may be found in the formative split between the 
two principal approaches to consumption in the first wave of historical studies in the late 1970s and 
1980s, a split that has effectively limited the contribution of history to the broader debate about 
consumption in the social sciences and humanities. Two largely self-referential enterprises emerged. 
One project traced the birth of ‘modern consumer society’ in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
Western Europe and the Atlantic world. The second focused on shopping and mass consumption, 
particularly the late nineteenth-century department store. These selective enterprises not only ignored 
many other forms, sites and meanings of consumption, but the temporal gulf between them disguised 
the incom-mensurability of their respective notions of modernity. Historians interested in the former 
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project turned to the ‘modern’ acquisitive desire for commodities and ‘novelties’ amongst a broadening 
middling sort and some artisans. Historians working on the latter, by contrast, argued that a modern 
consumer society only developed once the large bulk of society, freed from the regime of needs, was 
able to enter a system of ever-expanding goods and desires. The conceptual and empirical gulf between 
the two groups was deepened further by different methodological upbringings, the first steeped in 
anthropology and culture, the latter in social history and gender studies. Whereas historians of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Holland and Britain worked with a theory of culture inspired, in 
part, by Durkheim and Mary Douglas, where ‘need’ is as much a cultural construct as ‘desire’, writers 
privileging the twentieth century often employed an essentialist definition of needs that stood in 
stark contrast with the ‘culture’ of consumerism. In short, here was a disagreement about the very 
essence of human existence and culture. 
 
The theoretical divide underlying the chronological gulf in studies of consumption was deepened by 
competing national traditions of historiography. In Germany, the belated turn to consumption emerged 
from within the Weberian development of social history as Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Rather than being 
present at the birth of modernity, consumption here was one of its offspring; and even then (like other 
cultural subjects) it was less a subject in its own right than a source of answers to questions about class 
and status.1 Hence the almost iconic status of Bourdieu (rather than, say, Baudrillard) in German 
history seminars. Bourdieu’s treatment of taste and consumption in the formation of habitus can be 
easily accommodated within Gesellschaftsgeschichte; after all, Bourdieu’s idea of ‘the choice of the 
necessary’, though not economistic in the strict sense, continues to present the ‘habitus’ of the working 
class as the learned outcome of their material situation.2  In North America, by contrast, the recent 
revival of interest in consumption has been driven by a very different historiographical dynamic: the 
disillusionment with social history, especially with the ‘working class’, and the shift to gender and 
post-structuralism. Instead of producing ‘false’ needs, new sites of consumption, such as the 
department store, offered opportunities for an emancipation of the self and the transgression of 
dominant gender hierarchies. The late Victorian metropole suddenly exhibited some of the very 
features of post-modernity avant la lettre. 
 
If the strategy of Gesellschaftsgeschichte was to use consumption to buttress social history by showing 
just how subtle and distinctly ‘modern’ class and status were, feminist and post-structuralist approaches 
turned to consumption to question the very notion of modernity underlying social history. Either way, 
consumption was instrumentalized. It was not the principal subject or problem. Interest in consumption 
remained highly selective and fragmented. The department store spoke to questions about the 
gendering of public spaces, identities and desires. Advertising spoke to questions about semiotics. 
There were few connections here with the historiography on food, leisure and fashion.3 There was little 
dialogue with the fresh and expanding literature in anthropology and geography exploring systems of 
provision, material culture, life-histories and the processes and spaces connected to consumption before 
and after purchase.4  The synergy between the social sciences, history and the arts that had fostered 
studies of the birth of the consumer society stands in stark contrast to the situation for the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.5 There were simply too few historical building blocks for a general debate 
about the changing physiology of ‘modern consumer society’ in its subsequent adolescence, maturity 
or old age, let alone for a general historical narrative. 
 
The aim of this article is to outline some of the questions that may help structure such a debate. Should 
we think in terms of a linear expansion of western consumerism ending in global convergence? What 
was the underlying dynamic of this expansion and where should we locate its modernity? What was the 
place of consumption in social and political relations, and what do these connections (and  
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disconnections) tell us about the nature of ‘consumer society’? More broadly, what are the meanings of 
consumption and what should historians include or exclude? ‘Consumerism’ and ‘modern consumer 
society’, it will be argued, are concepts with diminishing analytical and conceptual usefulness that have 
privileged a particular western version of modern consumption at the expense of the multi-faceted and 
often contradictory workings of consumption in the past and are increasingly at odds with the current 
debate about the cultures and politics of consumption. 
 
 
 
Despite the explosion of books on subjects related to consumption in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, many studies address self-sufficient communities rather than engaging in a shared dialogue. 
In an insightful article five years ago, Peter Stearns observed the lack of connection between 
discussions of early modern and modern consumer society and turned to a stage theory to link the two.6 
Stage one witnessed the emergence of consumerist desire in early modern Europe and focused on dress 
and household items. Stage two saw the expansion of consumerism in the mid-late nineteenth century 
and was marked by a profusion of goods and leisure, the proliferation of retail outlets, and the spread of 
consumerist values into social spheres as diverse as child-rearing and pornography. As Stearns 
acknowledged, such a simple two-stage model called for a sharper periodization and more regional 
diversification. Consumerism in World History is the result of his further reflections and extends his 
question about European stages to the rest of the world. The geographic extension of the subject, 
however, was not accompanied by a rethinking of the underlying assumptions of western modernity. 
What is distinctive about modern society, Stearns reiterates, is ‘consumerism’, defined as the lure of 
material goods. This consumerism first emerged in eighteenth-century Western Europe, and from 
there was exported to the rest of the globe. The thesis follows directly from two interrelated a priori 
ways of viewing the subject: the definition of an acquisitive  individualist mentality as the defining 
feature of modern consumer behaviour and, since this originated in the West, a view of expansion that 
looks from the epi-centre (West) outwards. Both of these views are open to question. 
 
‘Consumerism’, for Stearns, ‘describes a society in which many people formulate their goals in life 
partly through acquiring goods that they clearly do not need for subsistence or for traditional display.’7 
Analytically this collapses different units of enquiry. Consumerism appears as mentality, behavioural 
motivation and individual action, as well as commercial institutions and a defining feature of society at 
large. It is problematic to read back from increased consumer spending the dominance of consumerist 
mentalities. For many people, it might be very ‘necessary’ for subsistence to purchase a car in suburban 
America, because of the lack of public transport and a dispersed socio-economic and cultural  
infrastructure, not because of a consumerist definition of one’s goals in life.8  Does this make these 
Americans more consumerist than the privileged citizens of New York or London or Tokyo who can 
forgo car purchase because they have the spending power to purchase a centrally-located flat? The 
acquisitive, materialist focus of ‘consumerism’ neglects the significance of forms and modes of 
consumption which do not centre on the commercial purchase of goods, such as visits to a club or 
museum, and the consumption of services and experiences more generally. Even shopping, that most 
basic form of consumption, involves a variety of functions from voyeurism to a search for ‘authentic 
sociality’; Daniel Miller’s ethnographic studies in London have noted ‘how shoppers struggle to make 
specific purchases that will not just reflect but act directly upon the contradictions they constantly face 
between the normative discourse that tells them who they and their family members should be, and 
how they find them in their specificity as individuals’.9  Consumption can be about managing familial 
and social relationships , not merely self-centred acquisitiveness. 
 
The first consequence of the narrow concept of ‘consumerism’ is thus a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Stearns finds what he is looking for: materialist consumerism as a key feature of western modernity. A 
less tautological approach would have been to compare acquisitive consumerist behaviour with the full 
spectrum of forms of consumption and their motivations; there is little here about alternative radical, 
social-democratic or nationalist consumer politics, and what there is is viewed only in terms of 
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resistance to consumerism. Yet, alternative visions of consumption have often been integral to the very 
shape and development of capitalist societies; for example, through the popular Free Trade movement 
in Victorian and Edwardian Britain which was driven by ideals of the citizen-consumer and dark fears 
of alien materialism and excess.10 To group contemporary mobilization under ‘anti-consumer protests’ 
misses the attraction of different approaches to consumption and the contribution of consumer 
movements in the European Union and, with lesser success, more globally to a widening transnational 
system of trade regulations.11 
 
The second consequence is to reinforce a sharp dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ society, 
East and West, societies defined by reciprocity and status versus societies driven by individualism and 
markets.12  Just as the consumerist fixation obscures the diverse forms and alternative modernities of 
consumption shaping western societies (which include reciprocity), so it reinforces a picture of less 
dynamic, ‘traditional’ societies in the East (ignoring their economic dynamism). As for the modern 
West, so for the traditional East, the cultural dynamics shaping subsistence and what sociologists have  
termed ‘ordinary consumption’ is simply bracketed.13  For the early modern period, Stearns thus grants 
China the display of expensive goods and high quality cloth, but these, he argues, were isolated 
instances of luxury, limited to the very wealthy, and incorporated into traditional styles and values. 
Eastern tradition, in other words, killed the dynamic energy of consumerism and the ever-changing 
tastes and goods this set free in the West. 
 
This equation of tradition with a lack of dynamism side-steps the considerable significance of 
consumption to social order and change in non-western societies. In the Mughal empire, ‘a great king 
was a great consumer’, in Chris Bayly’s words.14  Legitimacy of rule depended on a diversity of styles 
and the encouragement of artisans and traders to produce them. It was not any absence of fashion or 
diverse and changing tastes that marked the principal difference between this phase of ‘archaic 
globalisation’ (Bayly) and later global consumption systems, but the push towards uniform, 
standardized goods in the latter. Even more than India, China in the Ming period exhibits plenty of 
examples of what Veblen would later term ‘conspicuous consumption’.15  At the level of popular 
consumption, more people consumed everyday luxuries like tea and sugar in eighteenth-century China 
than in eighteenth-century Europe outside England. Nor was European consumption at this stage 
marked by some distinctive, uninterrupted development. As Kenneth Pomeranz has emphasized, a 
conventional contrast between a ‘normal’ European trend of continued expansion and a defective 
pattern of interrupted growth in luxury consumption elsewhere is undermined by evidence that 
European consumption levels remained static during a period of overall economic growth in the first 
half of the nineteenth century.16  The advance of Western Europe might have had less to do with some 
original European revolution of consumerist desire than with other sources, such as access to coal and 
the exploitation of the New World. 
 
Attention to parallels and contingency in the earlier period might also radically shift our understanding 
of contemporary global consumption. For Stearns, the question of consumption in Asia and Africa is 
one of reception and degrees of resistance. In what is perhaps the most ambitious part of the book, 
Stearns turns to religion to explain where the tidal wave of consumerism swamped societies and where 
it has been blocked or channelled into different directions. Where a rival value system with strong 
notions of otherworldliness existed, as with Confucianism in China or Islam in the Middle East, 
advance was slow. Where no such alternative value system existed, as in sub-Saharan Africa, 
consumerism advanced more easily. How consumption relates to other value systems and moral 
institutions is an important question that deserves more comparative analysis. Yet, the reduction of 
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consumerism into an acquisitive mentality might unnecessarily cast consumption and religion as 
competing self-defining universes. Why presume that an expanding consumer society requires a 
decline in religious intensity? ‘In the West’, Stearns argues, ‘consumerism rose amongst powerful 
strains of Christianity, but in an atmosphere where religious intensity, on the whole, was in decline.’17 
This is curious. For in Britain, that paradigm of the first consumer society, religious intensity was 
steadily increasing in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; evangelicals might have stressed the 
link between Christianity and commerce but they remained vocal opponents of consumerism. As with 
Victorian Britain, so with postwar Japan, there is an implicit assumption about the rival forces of 
‘markets’ and ‘culture’ at work. Stearns is surely right about the pressure of Americanization in 
postwar Japan, yet, again, the contrast between traditional values and an alien individualist materialism 
misses much that is most interesting and distinctive about Japanese consumption. For millions of 
housewives who made up the Japanese consumer movement, consumption was embedded within a 
larger universe of civic values that blended ideas of citizenship, national identity and the organic 
interest of producers and consumers.18 
 
How much global convergence is there around consumerism? Stearns points to pockets of resistance, 
Islamic revival, the indigenization of goods, blending of styles, and uneven distribution of wealth and 
leisure, but on the whole his evidence, from Disney to Pokemon, suggests the steady global advance of 
consumerism. Stearns, in a concluding reflection on ‘Who wins?’, is careful to balance an older élitist 
critique of mass consumption with an emphasis that for many people consumption serves ‘social and 
personal interests . . . [and] is not, always, as shallow as it seems’.19  Yet, again, the tendency to reduce 
consumption to a materialist acquisition of goods by individuals makes it difficult to explore the multi-
faceted workings of consumption in society and politics. Consumerism erodes identities and can  
disorient individuals, it is argued, even though it does not necessarily mean a complete surrender to 
‘western values’. Consumerism, measured in a rise in material standards, ceases to add happiness 
in established consumer societies. Stearns’ book might be read most profitably as a final twentieth-
century reflection working within an older tradition of historical sociology, reaching back to Weber, 
turning to materialist consumerism as a way of explaining the rise of the West. Yet consumption in 
the late twentieth century has become as much about services, experiences, and citizenship as about the 
acquisition of goods. In Britain, to take a society where this shift in discourse, practice and identity 
advanced especially rapidly in the 1990s, consumption and consumers entered the workings of such 
diverse spheres as health care, transport and government. The postwar consumer movement is on the 
verge of becoming a citizens’ movement. The older model of ‘consumerism’, which, after all, 
originated with an élitist and academic critique of mass consumer society, is ill-equipped to penetrate 
the different transmutations of consumption in society.20 Weber’s fear of a ‘Genussmensch ohne Herz’ 
(hedonist without heart) and Marcuse’s later ‘one-dimensional man’ consumed by a compulsive desire 
to purchase goods, were important chapters in the history of ideas. They may not be not the best  
analytical tools to come to grips with contemporary developments, where consumer identities have 
become suffused with questions of civic participation, cultural identities, and social and global justice, 
as well as with a drive to acquire goods. 
 
Social differentiation and uneven penetration is the contrasting theme of Heinz-Gerhard Haupt’s 
critical survey of Konsum und Handel in nineteenth-and twentieth-century Europe. Haupt puts South-
Western and Eastern Europe back into a story normally dominated by their north-western neighbours. 
Whereas ‘consumerism’ presumes the growing autonomy of a consumerist mentality, Haupt’s 
approach is more concerned with consumption as a process and its role in stabilizing or eroding social 
solidarities. This has three related analytical advantages. First, it gives as much attention to food and 
clothing as to more spectacular forms of consumption. Second, it rightly insists on the importance of 
scarcity as well as abundance in the making of consumer societies, and on the contribution of the state. 
Finally, it situates consumption in important non-commercial settings, like the household and public 
spaces, as well as in retailing. 
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Haupt argues for a categorical distinction between the nineteenth and the twentieth century. 
Nineteenth-century Europe was a ‘consumer society’, a social context in which a particular set of 
goods was available to certain groups who used them for self-representation. Twentieth-century ‘mass 
consumer society’ was qualitatively different, not only because an expanding set of goods became 
accessible to more people, but because ‘distinction’ through possession was becoming more complex 
as consumption became connected with many more social, political and cultural formations.21  Haupt 
offers a kaleidoscopic picture of ‘consumer society’ giving due space to differences between regions, 
generations, genders and professions. If there is little doubt about the general upward trend in the 
consumption of meat and alcohol, the picture remains one of sharp divergence across Europe well into 
the twentieth century. Skilled workers in France enjoyed lean meat while their unskilled brethren 
remained dependent on offal. In Spain, many were facing famine after the drought of 1905. In rural 
Austria, coffee only became part of the diet after the second world war. 
 
Nor was the triumph of ‘modern’, nationally-integrated markets over ‘traditional’ subsistence systems 
complete in early twentieth-century Europe. In Italy, less than one-third of all farms produced for the 
market as late as the 1930s. Again, the increase in real wages and disposable income in the late 
nineteenth century, well established for Britain, France, Germany and Sweden, was a far from general 
European phenomenon, side-stepping much of the Habsburg empire. Even in the 1950s, 60 per cent of 
income was spent on food and drink in Southern and Eastern Europe, a figure already left behind in 
Britain and amongst skilled workers in Germany by the turn of the century.22  Even for North-Western 
Europe, this is not a simple narrative of modernization. The arrival of the department store proceeded 
parallel to a rise in the  number of travelling salesmen and hawkers.23 And the spread of the department 
store was not an automatic reaction to urbanization and industrialization either — comparatively, 
France was advanced in the first, but not in the latter. Here, as elsewhere, Haupt’s sensibility as a 
comparativist sheds fresh light on old subjects, urging future research to leave the nation state as the 
natural unit of enquiry and instead to compare phenomena across societies, such as the distinct 
conditions that favoured the emergence of particular retail organizations in some cities but not in 
others. 
 
How consumption relates to collective identities and social solidarities has been a subject more 
extensively explored by sociologists and anthropologists than by historians. Haupt’s short reflections 
on consumption in relation to gender, ethnicity and nation are thus welcome; generational changes, so 
crucial to current debates,24 are a subject historians have yet to explore more fully. Normative 
discourses of separate gender roles did not necessarily match social realities of consumption — some 
men did cook — but they set the framework in which consumers oriented themselves. At the same 
time, the  identification of women as consumers also opened up new spaces of action, as in the 
department store, and, we might add, in civil society more broadly, especially through the expanding 
network of co-operative women at the turn of the twentieth century, where questions of consumption 
and citizenship were intimately linked.25 
 
The transformation of Europe into a ‘mass consumer society’ in the course of the twentieth century is 
the theme of the second half of Haupt’s study. Here again, the emphasis is as much on limits as on 
triumphs, and on ruptures as much as linear expansion. Scarcities and rationing during and after the 
two world wars receive as much attention as the growing consumer spending on furniture, clothing and 
entertainment. The reader is reminded of the social exclusion that continues to keep the material 
dreams of consumerism out of reach of large segments of European societies, not least pensioners and 
single mothers. Throughout, Konsum und Handel situates changing trends within the broader social 
contexts of economic growth and welfare patterns. 
 
                                                 
21 H.-G. Haupt, Konsum und Handel: Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen 2002), 20f. 
22 Ibid., 25, 26, 29.  
23 See also M. Finn, ‘Scotch Drapers and the Politics of Modernity: Gender, Class and National Identity in the Victorian Tally 
Trade’ in Daunton and Hilton, Politics of Consumption, op. cit., 89–107. 
24 B. Gunter, Understanding the Older Consumer: The Grey Market (London 1998); P. Thane, Old Age in English History: Past 
Experiences, Present Issues (Oxford 2000); J. Vincent, ‘Consumers, Identity and Old Age’, Education and Ageing, 14, 2 (1999), 
141–58; M. Nava and A. McRobie (eds), Gender and Generation (London 1984); Stephen Kline, Out of the Garden: Toys, 
TV, and Children’s Culture in the Age of Marketing (London 1993); B. Gunter and A. Furnham, Children as Consumers: A 
Psychological Analysis of the Young People’s Market (London 1998). 
25 F. Trentmann, ‘Bread, Milk and Democracy: Consumption and Citizenship in Twentieth-century Britain’ in Daunton and 
Hilton, Politics of Consumption, op. cit., 129–63; G. Scott, Feminism and the Politics of Working Women: The Women’s Co-
operative Guild, 1880s to the Second World War (London 1998). 
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Recognition of the multiple and often divergent functions and meanings of consumption raises 
questions about the very usefulness of working with two large ideal-typical systems of ‘consumer 
society’ and ‘mass consumer society’. The picture of a nineteenth-century ‘consumer society’ emerges 
more ambivalent than the concept signals. It suggests boundedness and fractures rather than any 
unstoppable or defining social system. As a dominant social formation it was limited to particular 
regions and cities as well as to particular classes. There may have been growing consumption, but very 
few societies and social solidarities had yet become defined by the practices or mentalities associated 
with it. Just as it is debatable to speak of a ‘class society’ if its members do not principally define 
themselves in terms of class, so we might ask when it was that individuals and groups came to define 
themselves as ‘consumers’. Though the economic use of the term can be traced back to rare instances 
in the early eighteenth century, the ‘consumer’ as a distinctive identity, as a form of self-description by 
individuals and groups and as a universal category of ascription and analysis by business, politics and 
academia only appears to have come fully into its own in mid-, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Europe and North America. Even then, the neo-classical view of the rational, utility-
maximizing individual that emerged out of the marginalist revolution of the 1870s was not the only (or 
the principal) representation of ‘the consumer’ competing for social and political attention at the 
turn of the twentieth century. To many radicals and liberals, ‘consumers’ were informed, ethical users 
of necessaries, performing important civic roles, as in J.A. Hobson’s image of the ‘citizen-consumer’ in 
Edwardian Britain or in the work of the National Consumers’ League (NCL) to improve working 
conditions and civil rights in early twentieth-century America.26  A more open, descriptive and less 
normative definition of ‘consumer’, based on the act of purchase rather than its underlying motivation 
or set of commodities, appears a rarer, second stage, such as when the NCL in 1925 proclaimed that 
‘every person who buys anything, from a bun to a yacht, is a consumer’.27 
 
 
Greater attention to contested meanings of the consumer in societies with different political traditions 
and socio-economic dynamics might tell us much about the changing salience of ‘consumer society’. 
In South Korea, for example, where the second half of the 1980s alone saw a 75 per cent real 28 
increase in the rate of consumption expenditure, a public debate developed about ‘excessive 
consumers’. Yet polls asking South Koreans to identify where they thought that excessive consumption 
lay in their everyday lives, produced children’s education at the top of the list, above leisure and 
travel.29  The meaning of ‘consumption’ and the identity of the ‘consumer’ and its place in social and 
political processes here is a radically different one from that in the luxury debates of eighteenth-century 
imperial Britain, or well-known western debates about mass consumer culture and ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ in the early twentieth century, premised on a binary of Bildung/culture versus 
consumption/leisure. 
 
How uniform and distinctive is European ‘mass consumer society’, the ideal-type used by Haupt for 
the twentieth century? Is there sufficient coherence and similarity amongst patterns of consumption in 
the last half-century to make this term as useful for the 1990s as for the 1950s? Here Haupt follows, on 
the one hand, Hartmut Kaelble’s argument for a general trend of convergence, even though pointing to 
disruptive moments and qualitative shifts (from class to life-style) and, on the other, Victoria de 
Grazia’s seminal distinction between an American ‘consumption regime’ characterized by individual 
choice in the marketplace and a European regime where consumer citizenship is sought through social 
participation and economic redistribution via the state.30  It is debatable how well these two arguments 
fit with the analysis of a ‘mass consumer society’. These ideal-typical distinctions might capture 
particular dimensions of consumption in particular societies at particular times while obscuring 
alternative developments at others; growing awareness of the limited significance of Fordist ‘mass’ 
                                                 
26 K.K. Sklar, ‘The Consumer’s White Label Campaign of the National Consumers’ League’ in Strasser et al., Getting and 
Spending, op. cit., 17–35; F. Trentmann, ‘Civil Society, Commerce and the “Citizen Consumer”’ in Trentmann, Paradoxes, op. 
cit., 306–31; N. Thomson, ‘Social Opulence, Private Asceticism’ in Daunton and Hilton, Politics of Consumption, op. cit., 51–
68. E. Furlough, Consumer Cooperation in France. The Politics of Consumption, 1834–1930 (Ithaca 1991). 
27 In the NCL’s official history, as quoted in L. Storrs, Civilizing Capitalism: The National Consumer’s League, Women’s 
Activism, and Labor Standards in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill, NC 2000), 22. 
28 See P. Maclachlan and F. Trentmann, ‘Civilising Markets: Traditions of Consumer Po litics in Twentieth-century Japan, 
Britain, and America’ in M. Bevir and F. Trentmann (eds), Markets in Historical Contexts, op. cit., chap. 9. 
29 With 23.5 per cent for education, and 19.8 per cent for entertainment, leisure and travel, and well below, durables with a mere 
8.7 per cent; from a 1993 national survey cited in S. Kim, ‘Changing Lifestyles and Consumption Patterns of the South Korean 
Middle-class and New Generations’ in C. Beng-Huat (ed.), Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities (London 2000), 71f. 
30 H. Kaelble, ‘Europäische Besonderheiten des Massenkonsums’ in H. Siegrist, H. Kaelble and J. Kocka (eds), Europäische 
Konsumgeschichte: Zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des Konsums (Frankfurt/Main 1998), 169–204; V. de Grazia, 
‘Changing Consumption Regimes in Europe, 1930–1970’ in Strasser, Getting and Spending, op. cit., 59–83. 
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production suggests caution about models of ‘mass’ consumption.31 European developments in the 
twentieth century might be even more diverse than Haupt allows. First, it can be argued that the 
‘European model’ contained different types of political organization and economic redistribution 
through which consumer citizenship was exercised — focusing more on civil society at the turn of the 
twentieth century and to some degree again at the turn of the twenty-first, but on the state in the period 
in between. Second, the consumption of social and public services (from welfare to culture) should be a 
more integral part of the analysis of ‘mass consumer society’. Groups suffering from social exclusion 
and low income, for example, may very well be left out of a consumerist dream world, but they 
nonetheless are significant consumers of other things — water, social housing, education, television 
and so forth. Even for more privileged consumers, the place and force of mass consumption (through 
markets) will remain inadequately explained unless it is connected to a study of the changing provision 
and understanding of public services; the presence of consumer discourse and practices in health care, 
to take one example, is pronounced in Britain. Some consumer movements argue that the contrast 
between ‘choice’ and political organization that underlies the ideal-typical contrast between America 
and Europe was a false choice in the first place and can be overcome. Transnational trends, not least 
through European integration and consumer advocacy, make for different regulations and possibilities 
in the sphere of consumption to-day from those in the first half of the twentieth century, often eroding 
the autonomous powers of states. 
 
 
 
So far we have discussed the attraction (and limitations) of distinguishing between different large-scale 
systems (consumerism, consumer society, mass consumer society). Yet how to account for the 
dynamism generated by consumption in societies in transition from one system to another? For 
societies in Northern and Western Europe, this question is especially pertinent for the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, partly because of growing overall purchasing power, but even more so 
because of the changing institutions, practices and sensibilities of consumption. The transformation of 
retailing was the engine of this change. Recognition of its centrality, however, has generally been 
framed through a narrow definition of modernity. The department store, in particular, has become 
synonymous with the rise of ‘modern’ consuming practices and sensibilities. The department store, 
which began to dot the urban landscape of Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century, owes part 
of its image as a pioneer of modernity to being contrasted with an atavistic, backward-looking and 
older community of small retailers. This negative assessment, Uwe Spiekermann argues convincingly 
in Basis der Konsumgesell-schaft, needs to be historicized as a construct inherited from earlier 
academic and party-political contestation in imperial Germany. Gustav Schmoller, the doyen of the 
historical school of political economy, deliberately downplayed the contribution of retailers to German 
modernization in order to highlight that of the German state.32 
 
Between 1867 and 1910 shops expanded by 512 per cent in Germany, a greater rate of increase than 
that of the population (343 per cent). These numbers, Spiekermann shows, hide a tremendous evolution 
and diversification of retailing. Instead of the caricature of the gemütliche, single shopkeeper, a 
spectrum of shops and retailing forms emerge, from the Magazin and travelling depots (Wanderlager), 
to itinerant traders and chain stores. The department store was merely one amongst several functional 
responses to the commercialization of society and one that incorporated evolutionary changes first 
developed in other settings. As Spiekermann points out, the department store in Germany was not only 
small in terms of material significance, with less than 2.5 per cent of retail sales on the eve of the first 
world war, but its fragmented lay-out, such as different cashiers for different parts of each floor, 
discouraged the emergence of the ‘flâneur’, the rambling and browsing shopper.33 
 
Diversification and differentiation, not concentration, emerge as the engines of modernity. 
Spiekermann’s principal historiographical aim is to write retailing back into narratives of modern 
German history. He recovers very different ‘modern’ forms of retailing, many of which fit poorly a 
Weberian image of modernization — an observation that can be extended to other spheres of con-
sumer culture, such as advertising.34  Communal experiments with centralizing sales in marketing halls 
                                                 
31 See J.A. Tooze, ‘Endless Possibilities? Historical Alternatives to Mass Production Fifteen Years On’, Social History, 25 
(2000), 247–50. 
32 U. Spiekermann, Basis der Konsumgesellschaft: Entstehung und Entwicklung des modernen Kleinhandels in Deutschland, 
1850–1914 (München 1999). 
33 Ibid., 381. 
34 The infant profession of advertising had to manoeuvre within a cross-fire of competing projects of modernity and tradition, and 
its successful expansion depended partly on its ability to incorporate some traditional criticism, for example by championing 
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could not compete successfully with the small shops  and street traders who worked closer to customers 
and offered more attractive  sales and credit. The Wanderlager, often decried by contemporaries as the 
very essence of shoddiness, here are reassessed for their modernizing potential: they developed 
efficient business structures, commercialized rural areas and distributed the surplus of industrial society 
in the form of remainders. The study thus complements the recent rediscovery of ‘modern’ elements of 
shopping in arcades and shop-windows in the early modern period.35  Looking ahead, it should also 
encourage a more ecumenical appreciation of the persistence of rival retailing practices and spaces, 
including street markets, second-hand consumption, car-boot sales and charity shops.36  There needs to 
be more exchange between theorists, sociologists and historians, before any transition to ‘post-modern’ 
or ‘post-traditional’ consumer culture can be meaningful. 
 
The modernizing force of retailing partly lay in its heterogeneity and its ability to learn from rival 
challenges. Rather than presenting organizations  and movements locked in ideological conflict, 
Spiekermann focuses on processes of collective learning. The battle between consumer co-operatives 
and profit-oriented shopkeepers thus becomes a story of successful adaptation, as the latter formed 
purchase federations on the model of the former to benefit from economies of scale. Far from lagging 
behind, retail continued to outspend industry on advertisement well into the interwar years, and far 
from being passive outlets for industry’s products, small shops emerge as a vital source of marketing. 
Shopkeepers not only adjusted their display and (increasingly finished) goods with a view to a 
particular social clientèle, but this differentiation went hand in hand with a growing routinization of 
communication and sales techniques within the shop. Professionalization and sales-training self-
consciously advanced this process. Customers and retailers alike  lost their personal distinction and 
habits. Shopkeepers and sales personnel were asked to discipline their own chattiness and bad moods, 
and refrain from self-expression (such as the use of strong perfume), while managing customers with 
universal sales techniques rather than individual charm. New skills were needed to classify consumers 
entering the shop, to anticipate a type’s desires, but also to demonstrate the meaning of consumer 
sovereignty by pointing towards a range of higher quality, more expensive goods.37  Spiekermann’s 
study suggests a new normative trend at the turn of the twentieth century, though, at times, a concern 
with retrieving the agency of retailers threatens to ignore the agency of consumers. Clearly, the 
changing relationship between personal and routinized interactions involved both consumers and 
retailers. Future research will need to explore the different ways in which shops and customers could 
mix elements of the universal commercial and uniquely personal, even intimate, in different areas of 
consumption. To what degree modernity resulted in depersonalization, as Spiekermann suggests, needs 
to be tested against the different forms of self-representation people perform in different arenas of 
consumption. As the American example of sales personnel introducing themselves by first name and 
place of origin suggests, there may be no linear trend or normative yardstick. Consumers (and retailers) 
may want to encourage personal exchange and a sense of community in a particular space — the fancy 
neighbourhood store which sells personal identity as much as goods — but not in others — the 
wholesale or outlet centre selling for price. Historians have yet to chart how different societies have 
developed and managed these different offerings of the consuming self.38 
 
 
 
Any serious discussion of consumer society must trace the practices and meanings of consumption as 
they are woven into social structures and actions that lie beyond the shop counter. Instead of  
oppositional models of analysis (consumption versus production) and of sequential models (consumer 
society after class society), the challenge of the next generation of work will be one of integration. The 
study of consumption has the potential to bring together the study of work, politics, family and 
collective identity in fresh ways. Indeed, it needs to do so if it wants to avoid the fate of 
                                                                                                                                            
aesthetic communication; see C. Lamberty, Reklame in Deutschland, 1890–1914: Wahrnehmung, Professionalisierung und 
Kritik der Wirtschaftswerbung (Berlin 2000). 
35 See C. Walsh, ‘The Newness of the Department Store: A View from the Eighteenth Century’ in G. Crossick and S. Jaumain 
(eds), Cathedrals of Consumption: The European Department Store, 1850–1939 (Aldershot 1999), 46–71; and M. Hilton, 
‘Review Article: Class, Consumption and the Public Sphere’, Journal of Contemporary History, 35, 4 (October 2000), 655–66. J. 
Benson and L. Ugolini (eds), A Nation of Shopkeepers (London 2003). 
36 A. Clarke, ‘ “Mother Swapping”: The Trafficking of Nearly New Children’s Wear’ in P. Jackson, M. Lowe, D. Miller and F. 
Mort (eds), Commercial Cultures: Economies, Practices, Spaces (New York 2000), 85–100. 
37 Spiekerman, Konsumgesellschaft, op. cit., 596ff. N. Gregson and L. Crewe, Second-Hand Cultures (forthcoming). 
38 For the transition from critiques of mass consumption to its acceptance in mid-twentieth-century Germany, see most recently, 
D. Briesen, Warenhaus, Massenkonsum und Sozialmoral (Frankfurt/Main 2001), albeit with a narrow focus on select academic 
and conservative élites. 
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historiographical marginalization experienced by earlier ‘leisure studies’.39  New studies on shopping 
and factory meals offer new approaches for broadening the social relations of consumption. 
 
How much the ideological valorization of consumption has changed in the last few decades is reflected 
in Erika Rappaport’s significant study of shopping in London’s West End in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Instead of commercial exploitation or oppression, Shopping for Pleasure is a 
story of consumers’ agency. Shopping became an emancipatory activity through which middle-class 
women defined a new sense of bourgeois feminine identity, carved out new public spaces, and became 
energized as political actors. This approach carries obvious affinities with recent theoretical interest 
in the ‘subversive’ nature of consumption.40  Rappaport makes several important revisions to popular 
theories. Thus, the analysis of credit purchasing and legal cases regarding married women’s debts 
reveals the significance of the legal context for familial consumption. Instead of supporting Veblen’s 
idea of ‘conspicuous consumption’ as a source of social status, Rappaport shows how ‘legislators, 
judges, and husbands perceived “excessive” consumption as potentially undoing that position’.41  There 
is a keen eye for distinct perceptions  of consumer culture within groups as well as tensions between 
them. The arrival of department stores divided residents and retailers alike, some anxious about its 
disruption of established gender roles and idyllic neighbourhoods, others greeting it as a vehicle of 
female improvement. 
 
In the commercial expansion of the West End in the late Victorian and Edwardian period, both the 
nature of consumption and the identity of the  shopper were redefined. The gaze of the flâneuse, 
developed in several magazines, extended the spatial and emotional dimension of consumption beyond 
the materiality of commodities. One way of reading Rappaport’s book is to see here one stage in the 
contestation of ‘the consumer’ as a new social actor. Middle-class women and organizations as well as 
journalists, playwrights and businessmen all tried to capture ‘the consumer’, and in the process 
redefined pre-existing social identities, especially those of women. Musical comedies of the department 
store, Rappaport argues, ‘housed socially acceptable yet erotic narratives about the mingling of classes, 
sexes, and money’ that shaped modern identities.42  Other genres distinguished between the educated 
flâneuse, whose window-shopping expanded a sense of humanity, and the irrational shopper, whose 
addictive pursuit of fashion resulted in a loss of individuality. Who did the women think they were? 
There is at times a conceptual slippage here that obfuscates the genealogy of ‘the consumer’ as a social 
identity. ‘Consumers no doubt came away with many readings of the [department store] plays’, 
Rappaport acknowledges.43  But did theatre-goers necessarily see themselves as ‘consumers’ when they 
went to a music hall? How did individuals respond to being bombarded with rival images and 
expectations of ‘the consumer’? The utopian and dystopian dimensions are important in themselves, 
but they also alert us to the need to know more about the spectrum in between. 
 
How the growing interest in consumption can refresh our thinking about industrial society is illustrated 
by Jacob Tanner in Fabrikmahlzeit, a highly original book on food at the industrial workplace in 
Switzerland in the first half of the twentieth century. The canteen functions as a prism of overlapping 
discourses and practices that connect work and home, individual productivity and social welfare, profit 
and health. Tanner encourages us to see workplace and family, production and consumption in the 
same frame of analysis, rather than as separate universes attracting separate communities of historians. 
The story begins with the scientific shift at the turn of the twentieth century from labour physiology to 
nutritional physiology. Whereas the first conceived of the human body in terms of energy and 
thermodynamics, the latter privileged a biochemical model in which hormones and vitamins provided 
vital signals and information. Instead of a fuel tank, the body became a communication system. 
Consequently, ‘muscular thermodynamics’ came to be less influential than previous studies of 
industrial modernity and Taylorism assumed.44  At the workplace and beyond the factory gate, a new 
politics of food emerged that approached questions of productivity, social harmony and national 
                                                 
39 Recent historical studies of tourism have tried to capitalize on the seminal sociological works by Urry and MacCannell on the 
centrality of touristic sensibilities for the experiential dimension of modern consumption: S. Baranowski and E. Furlough (eds), 
Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Culture and Identity in Modern Europe and North America (Ann Arbor, MI 2001). 
40 J. Fiske, Reading the Popular (Boston 1989) and also M. de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley, CA 1984). 
41 E. Rappaport, Shopping for Pleasure: Women in the Making of London’s West End (Princeton 2000), 69. See also M. Finn, 
‘Working-class Women and the Contest for Consumer Control in Victorian County Courts’, Past and Present, 161 (1998), 116–
54 and her forthcoming book The Character of Credit. 
42 Rappaport, Shopping, op. cit., 180. 
43 Ibid., 187. 
44 Cf. A. Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Rise of Modernity (Berkeley, CA 1990). 
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hygiene through a nutritional programme favouring vegetables and juice and discouraging meat and 
alcohol. The canteen became a social laboratory for creating healthy Swiss bodies. 
 
Tanner approaches this laboratory via two principal avenues, the work of the Schweizer Verband 
Volksdienst (SVV), founded in 1914, and the canteens at the firms of Sandoz, Ciba and Geigy. The 
SVV became increasingly influential in the creation and management of Swiss canteens, running well 
over 100 canteens in the metal and chemical industries as well as the public sector. In the 1930s, 
American ideas of industrial management were displaced by German fascist associations between 
nutrition and eugenics. Tanner shows how much the SVV’s programme was transformed at the 
workplace by acts of resistance and stubborn cultural trends. The SVV was a pioneering advocate of 
self-service, which synthesized ideas of rationalization in production and individualization in demand. 
By 1929, 37 per cent of canteen meals were offered à la carte through self-service. But how successful 
was this attempt to turn workers into individual consumers with a clear sense of choice? According to 
Tanner, no sharp break in food culture occurred. Many workers continued to bring their food from 
home and found increasingly ingenious ways of heating it up at the workplace. Rather than working 
against familial, domestic settings, the factory canteen came to absorb family traditions, setting itself 
up as an ‘alcohol-free substitute home’,45  in which women provided men with food. The SVV’s hopes 
of transforming Swiss nutrition had only limited success. Canteen budgets reveal a slight but steady 
increase in expenditure on vegetables and fruit in the late 1920s and 1930s, and only a marginal drop in 
that for meat. Meal practices, too, proved resilient, as most workers were unwilling to abandon the 
lengthy two-hour break in the middle of the day. 
 
The overlap of labour and consumption, of factory culture and domestic culture, poses a challenge for 
the picture of functional and spatial differentiation between mass consumption and mass production in 
the age of Taylorism. The dominant argument has been that, as capitalism switched to an intensive 
regime of capital accumulation in the early twentieth century, a functional and spatial separation 
emerged between the workplace with its task of rationalizing labour and the domestic sphere with its 
task of keeping workers fit and healthy by managing consumption.46  Consumer culture, in this 
account, followed the dictates of capitalist production — the private family used the goods produced by 
mass production (cars, radios, washing machines, etc.). Expanding the focus of consumption beyond 
private acts of purchase in the market-place complicates this functionalist argument and cuts across a 
simple divide of work-place versus private consumption. Even in advanced capitalist societies, or 
perhaps especially there, collective consumption has played an important role, from public services to 
energy consumption to canteens. Why some forms of public consumption have proved less viable than 
others (such as wartime government restaurants) is a challenging question. What is clear from the role 
of new nutritional ideas is that consumption at the work-place shaped as well as responded to the 
process of production. Thus, the practice of workers taking several short breaks — a pathological sign 
of laziness and inefficiency under the thermodynamic model — was promoted from the mid-1930s for 
its contribution to superior health and productivity.47 
 
Fabrikmahlzeit opens a successful dialogue between historical study and sociological models of 
consumption, ranging from Simmel’s discussion of the meal to Bourdieu’s work on habitus. In contrast 
to Bourdieu, Tanner shows that eating practices are not only used for ‘distinction’, but also have a 
cultural force of their own. At the same time, Tanner shows how right Bourdieu was to see food as a 
retarding element in social transformations, preserving older habits for which there may be little role in 
a changing society. Historians and pundits hanging onto notions of ‘basic needs’ or economistic 
interpretations of changing consumption patterns will find a lot to chew on in this study; those 
proclaiming an automatic correlation between a rise in income and a rise in meat consumption might 
want to note that Swiss people in 1952 still consumed less meat than they did in 1922.48  What is 
debatable is the concluding thesis of a sharp break around 1950, a conviction that unnecessarily 
prevents Tanner from exploring continuities in Swiss consumer culture. Here the argument relies 
heavily on shifts in nutritional science rather than the cultural practices of eating in the work-place. As 
early as 1948 Tanner finds academic commentary on ‘overfeeding’ displacing earlier concerns about 
how best to manage scarcity. This conceptual shift, it is argued, had dramatic consequences for the 
influence of nutritional science, which, after all, had acquired its institutional power-base and social 
                                                 
45 J. Tanner, Fabrikmahlzeit: Ernährungswissenschaft, Industriearbeit und Volksernährung in der Schweiz 1890–1950 (Zürich 
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46 M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London 1979). 
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legitimation through its position at the centre of the productivist project. But how many workers in how 
many canteens were troubled by ‘overfeeding’ or ‘overeating’ in the 1950s and 1960s? When did state 
policies and consumer legislation shift priority from nutrition to obesity? And are there not significant 
continuities in the expansion of self-service into other areas of consumption in the second half of the 
twentieth century? Studies of British diet and food cultures suggest it was only in the late 1960s that 
significant changes took place.49  Histories of West Germany in the 1950s suggest that memories of 
pre-war ‘scarcity’ continued to inform working families’ understanding and evaluation of growing 
affluence after the war.50 
 
 
 
What to do with politics in the study of consumption? This question has been a long-standing headache 
for students of modern consumer societies. In contrast to the literature on early modern ‘moral 
economy’ and popular protests, modern and contemporary historians have been slow to debate 
systematically the changing interface between politics and consumption. This is ironic, given the 
renewed importance of consumption for recent national and international social movements, as well as 
for some Western governments and political élites, most notably New Labour in Britain. 
Methodological assumptions, based on an instinctive bias towards the individual as the core unit of 
modern consumer society, may account for this historiographical lag. One assumption, which some 
economic historians continue to fall back upon, is that consumers are a messy agglomerate of utilitarian 
individuals with different interests and desires: they might briefly be driven to protest because of 
specific material grievances, but by definition any collective action is difficult to sustain. The other, 
more culturalist and sometimes explicitly post-structuralist approach has been to explore consumption 
in the construction of individual identity. What matters here is the relationship between individual 
lifestyle and the commercial and institutional preparation of a ‘self’ fit for consumer society. The focus 
is on governmentality, the generation of self and choice — no doubt a process saturated with power, 
but nonetheless one in which the political imaginary of consumers, their mobilization, and self-
understanding as collective actors have featured rarely. Yet this focus on ‘individual’ and ‘choice’ 
presumes a shift from tradition/community to liberal modernity/individual that is at odds with the many 
occasions in modern and contemporary history when consumption has been a political site for 
collective mobilization concerning civil society, democracy and global justice. 
 
The last few years have witnessed a new convergence of interest in modern consumer politics, driven 
partly by a broader academic and political re-discovery of civil society, partly by historians’ turning 
away from an older male, production and class-oriented vision of social democracy, partly by attention 
to the politics of everyday life, family and gender.51  The study by Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska on 
Austerity in Britain and the collection edited by Hartmut Berghoff on Konsumpolitik in twentieth-
century Germany now take us two steps forward in thinking about the politicization of consumption, 
and one step back.52  The politics in which they are interested here is in the first place the state and 
organized party politics: how do policies affect consumption, and how do parties use consumer interest 
and grievances? Consumption here is more or less taken as a given and of instrumental interest. 
Lizabeth Cohen’s A Consumer’s Republic, by contrast, pursues the larger question of how mass 
consumption became a dominant mode of political culture and political economy in the USA after the 
second world war.53  Here the interest is the changing meanings and functions of consumption and how 
these transformed the politics of space, community and, eventually, the democratic imagination itself. 
To a degree, the difference in these approaches reflects the different paths taken by consumer politics 
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in these societies — but only to a degree. They also reflect the persisting force of national 
historiographical traditions and debates. In spite of an advancing global system of provision and 
debate about consumption, the primary focus of these studies is not consumer politics as a subject in its 
own right but as a way of answering questions about power and political culture in particular national 
settings.  
 
Read next to each other, these books offer fundamentally contradictory conclusions about the state’s 
impact on consumption. The essays in Konsum-politik point to the limitations of state power and to 
long-term continuities in twentieth-century consumer politics across the divide of the second world 
war. Austerity in Britain, by contrast, presents the decade after 1945 as a sharp break in policy and 
party allegiance, manifesting itself in a new Conservative drive for markets and choice, away from 
wartime regulation. A Consumers’ Republic highlights the centrality of government resources and 
county and state policies and regulations in sustaining and moulding a more consensual project of mass 
consumption as an engine of material prosperity and democratic life in postwar America. 
 
A good argument for continuity is Christoph Nonn’s discussion of agricultural policies between 
Weimar and the Federal Republic — here the first world war, rather than 1945, emerges as a decisive 
break, as the memories of hunger create a new consensus of regulatory politics.54  Agricultural policies, 
he emphasizes, cannot simply be understood in terms of élite lobbying but reflect a shift in sentiment 
within popular parties, including the Social Democrats, who by the 1920s were pressing for a politics 
of productivity. This fits in well with a significant shift in opinion amongst organized labour and 
consumer movements in Britain in the same period, away from free trade towards trade regulation to 
reconcile producer and consumer interests.55  Speitkamp’s discussion of censorship and youth culture 
in the first half of the twentieth century finds a persistent gulf between the realities of expanding 
consumer culture and the unwillingness of political and cultural élites to entrust taste and choice to the 
market. Nineteen forty-five did not amount to a sharp break in popular attitudes to advertising either, as 
Berghoff’s critical evaluation of the profession’s role in the nazi and postwar years makes clear. These 
chapters are forceful reminders of the danger of positing some natural, essential consumer society. 
Businessmen, politicians and bureaucrats turned to regulation with a specific view of how consumer 
society worked and could be moulded. Yet they often generated the very opposite consumption patterns 
from those intended; nazi hopes to limit consumer demand by advertising about scarce resources 
instead drew attention to these goods and exacerbated bottlenecks. How contradictory consumer 
policies could be is illustrated in Schröter’s discussion of the young Federal Republic in the 1950s. 
Here clothes and food retailing were deregulated, but energy, housing and transport were not. For 
Ludwig Erhard, markets and competition offered a substitute for a genuine consumer policy, although 
even this was compromised by cartel legislation (1952) which allowed some vertical price-fixing  
favouring producers and traders at the expense of consumers. German competition policy was  
distinctly shaped by ordo-liberal ideas, equipped with tough laws, and, arguably, more centrally 
connected to debates about democracy than in postwar Britain where it was more an administrative arm 
of the state seeking to advance efficiency.56  
 
Austerity in Britain is more tightly drawn around a specific aspect of consumer politics: the rationing of 
basic consumption in Britain during and after the second world war, its administration, social 
consequences and growing politicization. Zweiniger-Bargielowska takes on the myth of the ‘postwar 
con-sensus’.57  As her detailed reconstruction of popular attitudes shows, far from universally accepting 
continued rationing after the second world war with a stiff upper lip, a growing number of British 
people turned against it. The groundswell of rising frustration, especially pronounced amongst women, 
favoured the Conservative revival in the late 1940s and 1950s.58  Put differently, Labour’s fair shares 
policies, far from symbolizing the popularity of the welfare state and shared sacrifice moulded in 
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55 Trentmann, ‘Bread, Milk and Democracy’ in Daunton and Hilton, Politics of Consumption, op. cit. 
56 See D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth-century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford 2001); S. Wilks, In the 
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wartime, were deeply unfair and, from an electoral point of view, suicidal, as voters turned to 
Conservative candidates promising choice and free markets. 
 
The question with these points is not whether they are separately true, but what do they mean in a 
longer and comparative framework? There is little engagement with the multidisciplinary field of 
consumer studies. Gender is given argumentative privilege, although much of the evidence suggests 
equally interesting divisions by generation, region, income and skill. Housewives were worse off than 
their husbands under rationing, but this is hardly surprising. It is well documented that food 
consumption in working-class families in previous free market situations was also highly gendered and 
hierarchical.59  The question is: did rationing exacerbate this gendered inequity and was it experienced 
as doing so? Labour’s fair share policies, likewise, might have been removed in practice from ideals of 
egalitarianism, and not have been universally popular. Yet this does not necessarily mean that there 
was a general loss of public faith in controls. In an ideal world, few people would voluntarily choose 
rationing, so the question becomes by whose standards was British rationing popular or unpopular? 
 
Austerity in Britain is most impressive when using social surveys and opinion polls to chart shifts in 
popular opinion. Here evidence does not always provide conclusive answers, however. Some polls 
point to a remarkable degree of continued popularity for controls. As late as 1953 a Gallup poll 
revealed 43 per cent opposed to the gradual disappearance of rationing, with 47 per cent in favour60 
— many democratic parties form governments with less support. This was far from a dramatic sea-
change from wartime opinion. In 1942, for example, 49 per cent wanted a continuation of rationing.61 
Women in the co-operative and labour movements organized mass demonstrations and petitions in 
support of controls in 1953–54. Observers from societies like Japan, also keen to curb spending and 
promote saving, found the degree of acceptance of rationing in Britain mind-boggling.62  How many 
politicians in other societies have dared to implement austerity measures after a total war and managed 
to win the next election? 
 
In addition to the popularity of a particular consumer policy, it might be useful, then, to ask about 
solidarity, compliance and legitimacy — that is, the willingness of people to accept a political 
framework as legitimate and to live by its rules without challenging the authority and social norms of 
the community. How do individual feelings translate into individual and collective action? Opinion 
polls are poor guides for this process, as the frequent gulf between consumer opinions and behaviour 
makes amply clear; most people indicate a preference for organic food, but very few buy it. Postwar 
Britain may not have generated a ‘consensus’ about policies but was perhaps nonetheless a society 
distinguished by a marked degree of cohesion and willingness to accept sacrifices without opting for 
wide-spread protests, violence or criminalization; even black markets in Britain were distinguished by 
a high sense of morality and social conscience.63  This contrasts significantly, for example, with the 
charged street politics and violent attacks on privileged consumers, shopkeepers and Jews in Germany 
during and after the first world war. To understand this, however, the study of consumer politics must 
connect material patterns of everyday life to the ideas and values which provide them with political 
meaning and direct their collective action. 
 
From this perspective, how much of a break in consumer politics are the immediate postwar years? 
Arguably, the debate about austerity resumed and sharpened an earlier divide between proponents of 
regulation and choice, institutional co-ordination and market, that had erupted during the first world 
war and widened in the interwar years. Tories absorbed the remaining Liberal free traders but made 
sure to complement their attack on rationing with trade controls and subsidies in other spheres of the 
economy. Labour consolidated its programme of controls, with sections of the party seeking to design a 
direct consumer policy and supporting state agencies, like the Council of Industrial Design, in their 
effort to ‘rationalize’ consumer habits.64  New arrivals, like the Consumers’ Association, developed 
further the interwar interest in consumer information and protection. In contrast to the late Victorian 
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and Edwardian free trade settlement, the consumer interest was now politically and culturally 
fragmented, with different meanings and spokespeople, and no longer at the centre of political 
economy and political culture. 
 
The middle of the twentieth century, arguably, sees a role reversal in the status of the consumer in the 
political imagination in Britain and America. Whereas consumption (and the representation of 
consumers) came to play a fragmented and subordinate role in the British political system,65 in 
America, as Lizabeth Cohen shows, the opposite dynamic was at work: mass consumption moved to 
the centre of American politics — and in due course transformed the nature of politics. The creation of 
‘A Consumer’s Republic’, in Cohen’s words, became the consensual political project of the postwar 
years, promising Americans greater prosperity, equality and freedom. This is less a story of sharp 
breaks than one of a series of organic mutations between different settlements of consumer politics. 
Citizenship and consumption are omnipresent categories, rather than successive ideal-types, but the 
respective weight and functional relationship between them change in these three settlements. Cohen’s 
account takes us from the ideal of ‘citizen consumer’ of the New Deal, where consumption was 
informed by collective interests, to ‘the purchaser as citizen’ of the Consumers’ Republic, where the 
individual pursuit of mass consumption would benefit the public interest, to that of the 
‘consumer/citizen/taxpayer/voter’ of the Consumerized Republic, where politics itself is viewed as a 
market. 
 
It would be too easy (politically and historically) to subsume this account under a narrative of 
‘economic imperialism’ in which the ideas and practice of a liberal market increasingly colonize other 
spheres of politics and society. Inevitably, this book is written within the context of a long-standing and 
distinctive American debate about whether consumer culture undermines democracy and community.66 
Politicians’ appropriation of the language of markets and the invasion of marketing knowledge and 
market sensibilities into political culture form the end-point of this study. Its main historical 
contribution, however, is in unravelling the political dynamics behind the confluence of consumption 
and citizenship at a micro and macro level of power and social relations. The Consumer’s Republic 
created a broad consensual agreement in a vision of society in which American citizens enjoyed greater 
affluence and freedom by participating in a mass consumption economy. This ‘consensus’, however, 
never amounted to political stasis. It was neither a natural, self-sustaining economic arrangement, nor 
did it preclude contestation. Cohen shows masterfully how the ideal of the ever-expanding American 
pie with growing slices for all changed in shape and distribution as the realities of class, race and 
gender came to structure mass consumption. Her discussion does for consumer politics what the 
‘systems of provision’ approach has done for consumer goods:67 it follows consumer politics from 
early ideas to their contestation and implementation as policies, to what we might call the social and 
political externalities of mass consumption. The spatial dimensions of mass consumer culture are a 
crucial link in the chain of analysis. At the level of federal policies concerning taxation and mortgage 
guarantees, she shows how the ideal of greater equality in a dynamic mass consumption economy was 
compromised from the beginning by inegalitarian, gendered social policies, such as the GI Bill. At the 
level of local politics, suburbanization and localism made for class and racial segregation. Public 
spaces became regulated or eliminated altogether. In turn, the spatial reconfiguration of consumption 
fed back into a revised image of ‘the consumer’ in the 1950s. The previously dominant female 
representation of the shopper was giving way to ‘Mr Consumer’, whose name is on the mortgage, who 
drives with his wife to the mall, and who controls access to credit. For Cohen, this regendering was 
symptomatic of the broader transmutation of the public-minded female citizen-consumer into the male 
purchaser as citizen. 
 
Cohen’s emphasis on the negative social and political externalities of the Consumer’s Republic, 
however, is balanced by her appreciation of how its egalitarian ideals also legitimized grass roots 
struggles for civic rights and social inclusion. Above all, African-Americans’ battle against 
discrimination made effective use of the new convergence of citizenship and consumption by 
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demanding their share in a mass consumer society; here, too, there was a political commodification of 
space as civil rights’ groups defined housing as one of the most ‘ “basic consumer goods”’.68 
These campaigns’ achievements became difficult to maintain, however, once public accommodations 
were jeopardized by suburbanization. 
 
Politics here stretches beyond a functional connection between material interest and party-political 
preferences to an inquiry into the consequences of a system of mass consumption for the political 
deliberation of public questions and for social inclusion and exclusion. For all its emancipatory 
potential, A Consumers’ Republic leaves behind a negative balance sheet. It is a social-democratic, 
historical pendant to communitarian analyses of the erosion of American community and civil 
society.69  As a historian, Cohen places little hope in the communitarian vision of disentangling the 
long-term intertwining of citizenship and consumption. She is at pains to emphasize how mass politics 
can generate common ideals, a theme of her earlier work.70  At the same time, there is a good deal of 
shared diagnostics. The economic recession after 1973 exposed how skin-deep and fragmented the 
public interest had become under the previous regime of mass consumption. Reaganism reaped the 
benefits of the historical convergence of consumption and citizenship. The ‘consumer’ had become a 
dominant identity of self-interest and personal entitlement. Americans have degenerated into a nation 
of shoppers, shopping for politics just as they shopped for goods. 
 
This approach to consumer politics opens up several vistas, but it also, perhaps, shuts off others. Cohen 
introduces an important historical dimension to the current debate about neo-liberal hegemony. Rather 
than presenting neo-liberalism as a paradigmatic shift in political culture in the age of deregulation and 
Reagan, she traces a long-term fragmentation of public politics to the proliferation of suburban malls 
and the application of market segmentation by politicians in the 1960s. The book’s second achievement 
is to contribute to present work seeking to place consumer movements wi thin political economy, rather 
than following a social movement narrative casting consumer advocates as opponents of a dominant 
regime. Naderism here emerges as much a symptom of the Consumer’s Republic as its proffered cure, 
reinforcing both the consensual ideal of mass consumption that marginalized alternative reform 
projects and the fragmentation of entrepreneurial interest politics. For all its strengths, this narrative 
obscures, perhaps unnecessarily, the growing contribution of international developments to consumer 
politics. The debate about GATT in the 1980s sparked a rediscovery of global issues for American 
consumer advocates. There has been a vibrant debate about global trade, environmental issues and civil 
society amongst consumer movements in America as elsewhere. Consumers’ International has been an 
influential forum for reintroducing questions of social justice. In Japan in the last two decades, 
consumption has become an increasingly strong social and political movement as well as a cultural 
formation.71  In China, the communist party state’s endorsement of ‘the consumer’ as an essential agent 
in modernization in the 1990s has opened up new (and often unintended oppositional) spaces for 
political action and association.72  These developments, and the way in which consumption has become 
linked to questions of identity, fit poorly the concluding image of the consumer’s having descended 
from being the voice of collective interests to the pursuer of personal entitlement. 
 
A Consumers’ Republic also raises a question about the causal correlation between mass consumption 
and public political apathy, which calls for more comparative work along the lines of Almond and 
Verba’s earlier project on civic culture.73 Concern about selfishness replacing a commitment to 
collective interests, and a decline in political engagement are as old as history.74  Yet why necessarily 
presume a trade-off between a sense of personal entitlement and a sense of social commitment? People 
might become more involved and assertive  consumers because they feel a sense of entitlement and 
because they want to support their community.75  Finally, the anti-Whiggish account of the 
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fragmentation of the American republic raises questions about the public spirit Americans lost. How 
collective, how public, how open, how shared was politics before the confluence of citizenship and 
consumption? There is sometimes an asymmetry in historical method here. The sensitivity attached to 
the changing meanings of the consumer, the critical questioning who is imagined by whom and who 
not, who had power in constructing which image and who did not, is rarely extended to the meaning of 
‘citizenship’ or ‘the public’, which are left standing as if they possess some essential meaning that does 
not require equal historicization. There is an implicit, debatable assumption that, prior to the 
transmutation of consumer politics into consumerized politics, there was a lot more of the shared public 
space and common stake on which a vibrant democracy depends. Yet is this not somehow at odds with 
the growing appeal of consumer politics for social movements in the first half of the twentieth century 
as the very instruments for overcoming barriers to full democracy, social justice and material well-
being? 
 
 
 
Consumer culture is at the centre of contemporary debates about freedom, identity and social justice. 
These debates have been most advanced in geography, sociology and cultural studies. Historians’ early 
interest focused on two phenomena: the birth of consumer society in early modern Western Europe and 
the Atlantic world, and the spread of ‘modern’ consumerism in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This article has argued for expanding the focus of historical enquiry into consumption and 
for critically re-examining the concepts and periodization underlying it. The task ahead is to write 
histories of consumption, not consumerism. Consumerism, or the lure of material goods for individuals, 
is only one point on a broad cultural spectrum in which consumption operates in modern and 
contemporary societies. The consumption of basic goods (water, grain, meat) continues to be a vital 
subject of identity and politics in societies which do not lack the disposable income for hedonism. 
Likewise ‘mass’ consumer society was only one particular social formation, particularly prominent 
around the mode of production of certain goods and not others. Two related problems have been 
highlighted: first, the danger of writing a stage narrative of consumption through a supposed transition 
from need to desire; second, that of framing the analysis in terms of the global expansion of a particular 
western type of consumption. Instead of working within a self-defined theory of mass consumer society 
or modern consumer society, historians now need to contextualize the different forms and functions of 
consumption, and the affiliated social visions and political systems competing with each other at the 
same time. This requires a more ambitious and ecumenical view of consumption, no longer limited to 
shopping and the market but looking beyond to what sociologists have called ‘ordinary consumption’, 
to social services and to systems of public provision.  
 
A new generation of historical work is emerging, seeking to weave consumption back into social and 
political processes. Yet there remains a notable tension between what has remained a predominantly 
national frame of analysis and what is after all a subject and process of transnational nature. There is, 
then, a considerable gulf between the study of commodities through a global system of provisions and 
historians’ preferred study of consumer societies in a national setting. National studies can reveal the 
significance of particular traditions in moulding consumption and weaving it into the social and 
political fabric. Sticking too solidly to national frames of analysis, however, risks reinforcing national 
historiographical subjects and debates, rather than leading to a new dialogue about consumer societies 
in different settings. What is needed now is greater awareness of transnational and comparative 
processes, so that historians of different consumer societies can discuss questions of convergence and 
divergence, consumption and citizenship, and the changing meanings and functions of consumption in 
the modern and contemporary period.  
 
There can be little doubt that the boundaries of ‘consumption’ and ‘the consumer’, as a subject and 
identity, expanded enormously in the course of the twentieth century, from goods to services, and from 
personal wants and social justice to questions of political governance — and did so with different speed 
and ambition in different societies. This inflation of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer’ poses a challenge 
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as well as an opportunity for historians. If everything is now consumption — from a museum visit to a 
hospital stay — the subject risks becoming too broad for any meaningful analysis. What historians can 
contribute in wrestling with this eternal dilemma of consumer studies is to show how we need to be 
more sensitive to the ways and contexts in which historical actors have appropriated languages of 
consumption to make sense of their actions and described themselves and others as ‘consumers’. There 
is need for a greater and more subtle distinction between the processes that we, as historians, want to 
describe as purchases, digestion or services (all consumption now) and the activities and subjects which 
historical subjects themselves thought of as consumption, and the boundaries that distinguished these 
from other spheres of life. 
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